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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STATE AID DISCIPLINEand
how the European Commission applies it have
played two crucial roles during the banking crisis.
First, the European competition authority carried
out its normal role of ensuring that state aid pro-
vided by member states to support their dis-
tressed financial institutions did not result in
distortions of the level playing field within the
single market. In addition, the European Commis-
sion, by imposing strict restructuring plans on
banks that received state aid, helped to mitigate
the risk of moral hazard associated with the bail-
ing out of financial institutions.
Successful interventions by the European compe-
tition authority during the banking crisis do not
imply however that Europe is well equipped to
resolve future banking crises. On the contrary, the
crisis has exposed the glaring absence of a Euro-
pean banking resolution authority. There is no cen-
tralised European framework, and responsibility
for crisis resolution remains a purely national
competence. In this situation there is a tension
between a single European banking market in
which cross-border banks have become an impor-
tant feature, and a set of national authorities with
domestic mandates. The current set-up, with lim-
ited or no coordination between national resolu-
tion authorities, which sometimes have different
objectives, has been exposed by the crisis as
having limits. The Icelandic banking debacle in par-
ticular has illustrated the shortcomings1.
One potential solution to the coordination problem
would be to centralise the responsibility for crisis
management and resolution in the hands of a
European resolution authority. Several policy-
makers have proposed this, including Interna-
tional Monetary Fund managing director
Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2010). Despite its
appeal, it is far from clear, however, if such a solu-
tion has any chance of being put into place. 
This policy contribution argues that even if the EU 
succeeds in rapidly setting up a European bank-
ing resolution authority, the European Commis-
sion, in its role as the EU’s competition authority,
must continue to play an important part in crisis
resolution through exercising its state aid control
powers. This will not only help to prevent distor-
tions in the single market but will also limit moral
hazard. In the post-Lehman world of ‘too big to fail’,
the risk of moral hazard could be heightened
because governments might engage in excessive
injections of public money. Hence, although a
European banking resolution authority would have
to be able to offer reassurance to banks in terms of
the credibility of its rescue operations, it would
also need be suitably tough towards bank man-
agement, shareholders and subordinated creditors
in order to limit moral hazard.
In case a European banking resolution authority
were judged not to be politically feasible, or should
its creation be delayed, we propose (along the
lines of Nguyen and Praet, 2010) that the Euro-
pean competition authority carry out a second
function; namely it would coordinate between
national resolution authorities, by taking full
advantage of its state aid control mandate. In this
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‘The crisis has exposed the glaring absence of a European banking resolution authority; there is
no centralised European framework, and limited or no coordination between national resolution
authorities, which sometimes have different objectives.’
1. See Pisani-Ferry and
Sapir (2010) for an
extensive discussion of
EU banking crisis
management.case, state aid control would be used not only to
mitigate moral hazard, by imposing  'remedies' on
proposed bailouts, but would also help address
the coordination issue, by fostering cooperation
between member states in the case of cross-
border bank failures.
State aid control thus has a crucial role to play in
the future European banking crisis landscape. If a
European banking resolution authority can be
established rapidly, state aid control will comple-
ment it. If a European banking resolution authority
cannot be established, state aid control will be a
partial substitute.
This policy contribution is structured as follows.
Section 1 defines the role of a resolution authority.
Section 2 presents the current variety of situa-
tions in Europe and describes the central role
played by the European Commission through its
exercise of state aid powers. Section 3 explores
the extent to which the European crisis manage-
ment framework could further benefit from state
aid control. Section 4 concludes.
1 WHAT IS THE ROLE OF A RESOLUTION
AUTHORITY?
In order to determine how the competition author-
ity could better contribute to the crisis resolution
framework, it is first necessary to define the vari-
ous stages of the resolution process, and the dif-
ferent roles the resolution authority would play.
When faced with a systemically important ailing
institution, a resolution authority works like a
team of doctors in an emergency room. The emer-
gency physician first stabilises the patient. Then,
in a second stage, the surgeon may operate to
restore the patient's long-term health. If the dis-
ease is incurable, palliative measures may be
applied so the patient can depart in peace.
These different stages are familiar to resolution
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authorities. In an urgent situation, the resolution
authority, like an emergency physician, first
attempts to rescuethe ailing bank. The emergency
arises from the fact that the charter value of a
bank can rapidly be destroyed if its reputation
cannot be restored. The resolution authority's
objective will be to do what is needed to stabilise
the situation and keep the bank afloat if possible.
The actions taken by the resolution authority at
this stage will therefore pave the way for an
orderly resolution. A private sector solution is gen-
erally preferred but may be impossible, for exam-
ple due to lack of time, to an excessively
risk-averse financial sector or if the ailing bank is
too large to be absorbed by a competitor. In such
cases, the stabilisation process will require public
funds.
Once the ailing bank has been stabilised, the res-
olution authority works to restructure it. In this
phase, the authority, if it undertakes an open-bank
resolution, restructures the bank's assets and lia-
bilities and reviews its business strategy. The pri-
mary objective will be to restore the long-term
viability of the ailing institution. The restructuring
of assets will aim to offload risks, and divest
unprofitable activities. Additionally, the authority
may want to restructure liabilities to make sure
that uninsured creditors and shareholders effec-
tively contribute to the resolution and share part
of the burden.
Alternatively, if viability cannot be restored, the
resolution authority will move to a closed-bank
solution, aimed at orderly liquidation. The ailing
institution will be wound up by the authority which
will make sure that systemic functions are main-
tained. Systemic functions can be transferred to
another institution that will be able to assume
responsibility for them. Similarly, insured deposi-
tors will be either passed to a sound institution or
paid off. Finally, in order to minimise the use of
state resources, losses will be transferred to
‘State aid control is crucial. If a European banking resolution authority can be established
rapidly, state aid control will complement it. If a European banking resolution authority cannot
be established, state aid control will be a partial substitute.’shareholders and creditors, who will split them on
the basis of seniority.
2 THE SITUATION IN EUROPE
Unlike the United States, where the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is in charge
of resolving most banking crises, Europe has no
single authority responsible for crisis resolution.
Rather, the framework is decentralised, with sig-
nificant differences between member states. In
some countries there is a single resolution author-
ity. In general, however, crisis management
responsibilities are allocated to different authori-
ties including the supervisor, the central bank, the
finance ministry, the deposit guarantee scheme
or judicial bodies, such as a commercial court or a
receiver. Because cooperation between these
national authorities is difficult, various coordinat-
ing structures, such as domestic standing groups,
have been proposed, but with limited and variable
success (see for example ECFIN, 2008).
In a decentralised setting, an international-coor-
dination framework is also needed so that there
can be orderly resolution of a crisis affecting a
cross-border institution. Even though there are
many different coordination bodies already active
at the European level, none is specifically in
charge of crisis resolution. In the recent crisis,
therefore, cooperation had to be partly improvised
by bodies such as the European Commission, the
European Council and the ECOFIN Council.
An interesting feature of Europe’s decentralised
resolution system, which has gone largely unre-
marked during the recent crisis, is that it might, in
theory, have some ‘disciplining effect’ on banks.
Indeed, just as the multiplicity of creditors makes
debt restructuring more complex – which is why
bond restructuring is harder than bank-debt
restructuring for nonfinancial firms, thereby
‘hardening the budget constraint’2 – having mul-
tiple bailout agencies may complicate the refi-
nancing of an ailing bank. On balance, however,
the European experience during the crisis has
shown that, while there is too little rather than too
much centralisation, national authorities end up
having no alternative to the bailing-out of sys-
temically important institutions. Therefore,
progress towards centralised or coordinated reso-
lution should be designed with the need to reduce
moral hazard kept firmly in mind.
In this connection, Europe can make use of one of
its specificities, namely the fact that state aid
must be authorised by the European Commission.
This feature is not specific to the financial sector
and is justified by a desire to avoid distortions to
the single market that would arise from differ-
ences in member states' willingness and capac-
ity to support firms in distress with state aid.
Therefore, an ex-post check by the European Com-
mission of any aid granted by a member state
takes place, in an attempt to minimise distortions
and to avoid subsidy races.
In this context, any aid granted by a member state
during the crisis to support its financial sector or
to rescue one of its financial institutions was
reviewed and assessed by the European Com-
mission and had to be rubberstamped before it
could be implemented. The way the European
Commission’s state aid control powers are struc-
tured, with a focus on individual state aid cases,
may not have been particularly suited to address-
ing a systemic crisis. However, the Commission
interpreted state aid control with adequate flexi-
bility at the height of the crisis in the autumn of
20083, giving primacy to stability concerns. This
allowed the Commission to play an important role
in coordinating member states' actions, minimis-
ing distortions of the internal market and mitigat-
ing moral hazard.
2. See for example Bolton
and Scharfstein (1996).
3. See Beck et al (2010) for
a detailed discussion of
state aid control in
banking in the recent
crisis.
‘During the crisis, national authorities have ended up with no alternative to the bailing-out of
systemically important institutions. Therefore, progress towards centralised or coordinated
resolution should be designed with the need to reduce moral hazard kept firmly in mind.’
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The role of the European Commission in the
recent banking crisis
Table 1 compares the European Commission with
a resolution authority in terms of their role in
banking resolution. Surprisingly, the Commis-
sion’s powers resemble somewhat those of a res-
olution authority, especially in the restructuring
phase associated with state aid. Indeed, even
though the Commission does not intervene
directly to manage a crisis case, the Competition
Directorate-General nevertheless assesses the
viability and the restructuring plans of institutions
to which aid is granted. If the Commission judges
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that viability cannot be restored, it will normally
not authorise state aid and may require a
liquidation plan.
The Commission’s role in crisis management
derives from its intervention in the restructuring
phase. The major difference between the Commis-
sion and a banking resolution authority is that the
Commission is not called on to intervene directly in
the rescue phase, because it cannot provide public
funds. Yet, it has undoubtedly influenced how
national resolution authorities behaved in the
rescue phase during the crisis. The Commission's
decisions have created a jurisprudence that allows
national authorities to infer how DG Competition
would be likely to assess their case.
Table 1: Comparison of the European Commission role in the context of state aid assessment with the role of
a resolution authority 
European Commission Resolution Authority
Nature of
authority
Politically-led supranational authority with regulatory
powers.
Authority with regulatory, administrative or judicial
powers, depending on the chosen framework.
Timing of
intervention
Art 108 (3) of the Treaty foresees that member states
will inform the European Commission in sufficient time
of any plan to grant an aid. The Commission may decide
to open a procedure if it considers that the aid is not
compatible with the internal market. In such case, the
member state shall not put its proposed measure into
effect before the final decision of the Commission. 
However, during the crisis, given the emergency situa-
tion, in many instances, state aid was granted and
effective before the release of the Commission’s final
decision, with the risk to having to discontinue or to
recover aid in case of non-compliance with EU rules.
The intervention of a resolution authority is structured in
two phases : 
• Rescue phase: a resolution authority should be able
to act preventively, before state aid is granted, to initi-
ate, eg a private sector solution. Rescuing the bank
may also require to mobilise public funds.
• Restructuring phase : in the restructuring phase, the
authority should be able to act in a way that restores
the long term viability (open-bank resolution) and
that embeds state aid control principles (viability,
restructuring cost burden sharing with incumbent
owners, and remedies for competitive distortions).
If restoring the long term viability is not possible, the reso-
lution authority could act as a receiver or liquidating agent
(closed bank resolution) and wind up the institution.
Interested
parties
The European Commission is the arbiter between:
• Banks that receive state aid and their competitors.
• Member states.
The resolution authority is arbiter between:
• The different stakeholders of the ailing institution: the
resolution authority either ensures that long term via-
bility is restored and restructure liabilities so as to
make shareholders and uninsured creditors partici-
pate to the burden; or liquidates the institution (max-
imises the return on the sale) and distributes the
proceeds according to seniority rights.
Assessment
criteria
In order to be compatible with the internal market, state
aid must
• Be necessary to prevent serious disturbances in the
economy.
• Be limited to the minimum necessary.
• Not result in unacceptable distortions of competition.
The resolution authority can be required to opt for the
least cost solution, even though exemptions can be fore-
seen for systemically important institutions.
Funding The European Commission role does not require any
specific funding.
The resolution authority needs to be able to tap public
funds.In addition, the Commission has published several
communications describing its assessment crite-
ria for different interventions, including recapital-
isations, funding guarantees and the treatment of
impaired assets4. For each of these rescue opera-
tions, the Commission explains in detail the mini-
mum requirements that state aid must fulfil in
order to be compatible with the internal market.
For instance, the communication of 5 December
20085specifies a pricing methodology for recap-
italisation operations, which establishes an illus-
trative corridor of acceptable prices based on
government bond yields, credit default swap
spreads and equity risk premiums. The methodol-
ogy also covers step-up features that incentivise
the exit of public capital over time. Depending on
the nature of the capital provided, the price has to
be closer to the upper or lower bound of the corri-
dor adopted. The communication goes as far as
calculating indicative average required rates of
return. Similarly, the communication of 13 Octo-
ber 20086lists some behavioural constraints that
should be respected by institutions benefiting
from state guarantees. The constraints include
restrictions on commercial conduct, advertising
and balance-sheet growth. 
That said, despite its influence on the rescue and
restructuring process, the Commission is clearly
not a resolution authority, as it does not decide
upon the resolution path nor does it pay the final
bill. At most, it acts as a referee and provides a dis-
pute-prevention mechanism, both for member
states and for institutions receiving aid and their
competitors. Assigning the Commission the full
role of a resolution authority would require elimi-
nating hurdles that would be both politically diffi-
cult and economically unsound as it would create
a conflict of interest for an institution that would
have the double mission of protecting competition
and guaranteeing financial stability7.
However, as explained in the remainder of section
3, the way forward, we believe, is to give DG Com-
petition a more explicit and enhanced role in state
aid control role, regardless of the degree of cen-
tralisation. We examine what this role could be
using two scenarios: a single European resolution
authority, and a decentralised system.
A first model: state aid control as a complement
to a European Banking Resolution Authority
In the first model, a single resolution authority
would be established. Two independent authori-
ties would then coexist, one responsible for crisis
resolution and the other – the European Commis-
sion – for competition, and, in particular, state aid
control. This coexistence of two separate agencies
would allow a distinction to be made between ex
ante rescue measure design and ex post assess-
ment and control.
Clearly, establishing a new independent crisis res-
olution authority will not be easy, at least in the
short term. It will necessitate addressing several
challenging issues. First, a resolution authority
must have access to public funds. Different
options might be considered, including creating a
European resolution fund financed by the private
sector, as recently suggested by EU Internal
Market and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier
(2010). The creation of such a fund, however,
raises a number of difficult questions about its
funding, its governance, the incentives it creates
and its broader impact on the financial industry.
Yet, the combination of a single resolution author-
ity and a single resolution fund, if sufficiently cap-
italised, would be a clear and consistent model.
Second, the respective missions of the two insti-
tutions would need to be clearly defined8, and the
accountability issue addressed. In theory, defin-
ing the responsibilities of each institution could
be relatively easy since the resolution authority
acts first, and the competition authority second.
Therefore, the resolution authority should make
sure that it embeds in its decisions the EU state
aid control principles – relating to viability, the
sharing of the restructuring costs with the incum-
bent owners, and other measures to remedy com-
petitive distortions. It would indeed always be
possible for the European Commission to chal-
lenge ex post a decision of the resolution author-
ity to bail out a particular institution, either on its
own initiative or following a complaint of unfair
4. See the European
Commission’s
communications on: the
return to viability and the
assessment of
restructuring measures in
the financial sector in the
current crisis under the
state aid rules (22 July
2009); the treatment of
impaired assets in the
Community banking sector
(25 February 2009); the
recapitalisation of financial
institutions  in the current
financial crisis: limitation of
aid to the minimum
necessary and safeguards
against undue distortions
of competition (5
December, 2008); and the
application of state aid
rules to measures taken in
relation to financial
institutions in the context
of the current global
financial crisis (13 October,
2008).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Currently, the
Commission is only
responsible for
competition and not
explicitly for financial
stability. However
throughout the crisis,
the Commission's policy
has effectively been to
support financial
stability, while trying to
minimise single ,arket
distortions. The
objective of the
Commission was to
balance short-term
stability problems with
medium-term
competition concerns. If
crisis resolution and
competition powers
were gathered within a
single body, the
mandate of this body
should nevertheless
explicitly address this
balance and specify
how this authority
should solve the
potential trade-off.
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ever, because the competition authority would
always have the last word regarding state aid, the
model needs to explicitly clarify how the balanc-
ing act between financial stability and competi-
tion will be achieved.
In this model, state aid control would therefore
remain extremely important, although it would only
be responsible for the second of the two objectives
outlined earlier, namely limiting moral hazard and
avoiding excessive bailouts by taking advantage
of the power of the European Commission.
A second model: state aid control as a partial
substitute for a European Banking Resolution
Authority
Even if the first model were judged desirable, its
implemention is likely to take several years, in
which case coordination would still need to be
reinforced. As explained in this sub-section, ex-
post state aid control in the restructuring phase
could then be used as a powerful lever to reinforce
the incentive for national authorities to cooperate
in the rescue phase of the management of a bank-
ing crisis.
There are several ways for the Commission to play
a more prominent role in the coordination of
national resolution authorities.  Dispersed initia-
tives, some of which are still in the reflection
phase, have been launched. These form a patch-
work which, once integrated, should reinforce the
resolution framework and facilitate a coordination
role for the Commission. These initiatives deal
with issues as diverse and challenging as the
development of a common resolution toolkit for
national authorities, the recognition of the group
dimension in insolvency laws, or the burden shar-
ing between states and with the private sector. All
of these initiatives could benefit from a discussion
with the state aid control authority (the European
8. A related topic, which is,
however, not addressed in
this policy contribution is to
determine how the future
European banking authority
could contribute to the
creation of this single
resolution authority.
9. According to Article 10 of
the proposal, the European
banking authority may be
called to facilitate and
coordinate the action of
supervisory authorities in
emergency situations.
Where necessary, the EBA
can adopt individual
decisions requiring
supervisory authorities to
take the necessary actions
to ensure that financial
institutions do satisfy legal
requirements laid down in
the relevant European
directives. Yet, the same
proposal also foresees that
in cases in which this would
impinge on its fiscal
responsibilities, a member
state can appeal against
the decision of the EBA. In
such a case, the Council is
called to decide on the case.
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Commission) to ensure that they are compatible
with the discipline of European competition policy.
Another avenue worth exploring would be to see if
the Commission could integrate in its state aid
assessment criteria the possibility that non-coop-
erative decisions taken by a national resolution
authority in one member state may have a detri-
mental impact on another member state. Thus,
national authorities would still not be obliged to
cooperate to resolve a crisis affecting their respec-
tive countries, even though crisis management
and resolution is deemed to be a matter of
common interest. But, at least the consequences
for other countries of their decisions would be sub-
ject to the Commission’s ex-post scrutiny.
Ex-post scrutiny by the Commission would con-
stitute a useful complement to the currently
incomplete ex-ante coordination framework.
Authorities in Europe are currently investigating
ways to reinforce ex-ante coordination. Given that
the powers of resolution authorities are allocated
to different authorities, this requires the devising
of several coordination structures, suited to the
various authorities of a similar nature. For
instance, coordination between supervisory
authorities in the rescue phase is clearly
addressed in the Commission’s proposal for a reg-
ulation of the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil establishing a European banking authority
(EBA) (Commission, 2009b). This proposal also
contains safeguard measures, which might limit
its efficiency, especially in an emergency situa-
tion9. The ex-ante coordination of finance min-
istriesseems to be less well-defined, even though
they decide on the allocation of public funds. The
Council has, therefore, started to devise practical
arrangements within the Council to enhance EU-
wide coordination in cross-border crisis resolution
between member state governments (see Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2009). However, this
coordination process seems to focus on general
‘The Commission could integrate into its state aid assessment criteria the possibility that non-
cooperative decisions taken in one member state have a detrimental impact on another. Thus,
the consequences for other countries of state aid schemes would be subject to ex-post scrutiny.’crisis management policies and not on specific
crisis cases.
Finally, even if the ex-ante cooperation framework
was significantly reinforced, it would still, in most
cases, rely on voluntary agreements, such as the
2008 memorandum of understanding (ECFIN,
2008). However, national authorities may not
necessarily have the incentives to cooperate or
may even have dissenting opinions on how to
resolve a crisis. These differences may result from
a diversity of factors, including different assess-
ments of the crisis situation, asymmetric infor-
mation between national authorities, or the
asymmetric impact on national financial systems
of resolution measures.
Despite these difficulties and differences, national
authorities in charge of crisis resolution should try
to coordinate their actions and determine a
common resolution path so as to resolve the crisis
situation in an orderly way. Determining such a
path need not imply that all the countries partici-
pating in a resolution implement the same set of
actions.  What it does imply, however, is that situ-
ations should be avoided in which the authority in
one country ignores the negative externalities
that its actions could cause on other participating
countries. For instance, a member state should
not be allowed to rescue a domestic institution in
such a way that it would directly threaten the sur-
vival of its systemic foreign subsidiaries. This
could happen, for example, if home authorities
require, at short notice, the stopping of liquidity
flows to subsidiaries previously funded by the
mother company.
The European Commission could play a key role in
this process. Indeed, DG Competition's ex-post
assessment of state aid cases could explicitly
incorporate the required degree of cooperation
between the different member states. Article
107.3(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) specifies that a state ‘aid
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy
of a member state’ may be considered to be com-
patible with the single market and, therefore,
authorised. In fact, one could argue that if such aid
creates a ‘serious disturbance’ to the economy of
another member state, it should be judged as
incompatible with the single market and, there-
fore, not be authorised. The awareness on the part
of national authorities of these rules would reduce
their motivation to act non-cooperatively and
would encourage cooperation in the early phases
of a rescue process. It would, thus, result in coor-
dinated, orderly restructuring efforts, thus bene-
fiting the Europe’s financial industry as a whole.
In this model, the role of DG Competition would
therefore be significantly enhanced: it would par-
ticipate explicitly in the resolution regime by
enforcing competition rules and limiting moral
hazard, and it would give strong incentives to
cooperate, already in the rescue phase. Therefore
the European Commission’s ex-post assessment,
focused on cooperation between authorities,
would usefully complement the ex-ante, currently
incomplete, cooperation model. Consequently,
such reform would contribute to achieving the two
overriding objectives of a new resolution frame-
work, namely improving coordination and limiting
moral   hazard. 
4 CONCLUSION
Improving the bank resolution framework is a cru-
cial priority for the reform process in Europe. It
should be tackled with two objectives in mind:
improving coordination between member states
and alleviating moral hazard. While Europe faces
quite a challenge with respect to the first objec-
tive, it should take full advantage of the commit-
ment power that state aid control represents and
which, as this policy contribution has argued,
could in fact help with both objectives.
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